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Mexico's Caucidn Bursaitil:




Since 1993, Mexico has significantly reformed its banking laws, largely to meet its
obligations under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Such reform is
necessary for Mexican enterprises to gain access to more affordable credit that their com-
petitors within the NAFTA enjoy under U.S. and Canadian law.1 Secured financing cre-
ates more affordable credit by lowering creditor risk. While efforts to overhaul Mexico's
secured financing regime have been initiated,2 the current state of creating and recording
secured interests in Mexico remains burdensome, and therefore uninviting, for potential
foreign creditors. One secured financing mechanism, the cauci6n bursdtil (Securities
Guaranty), introduced in 1993, is intended to offer a more workable secured interest
alternative for creditors contemplating entry into the Mexican market. However, the
Mexican system's continuing attention to title and the distinction between in rem and in
personam interests under its secured financing regime potentially impedes the ability of a
mechanism like the Securities Guaranty to bring Mexican secured financing law more
into line with its NAFTA partners. Further, any ownership limitations placed on foreign
actors operating within the NAFTA will also affect the ability of those actors to obtain
secured interests in Mexico. From this, Mexico's in rem/in personam distinction within its
secured financing regime, coupled with its lingering foreign ownership limitations, may
have important consequences for Mexico's obligation to afford foreign financial institu-
tions "national treatment" under article 14 of the NAFTA. Moreover, distancing title from
the structure of Mexican secured financing mechanisms may bring Mexico closer to ful-
* J.D. Candidate, May 1999, Columbia Law School, New York, New York.
1 "Under the NAFTA, Mexican enterprises will be competing on an equal basis with U.S. and
Canadian enterprises that have access to cheap and more abundant credit, putting the Mexican
enterprises at a competitive disadvantage:' John M. Wilson-Molina, Mexico's Current Secured
Financing System: The Law, The Registries and the Need for Reform (visited June 30, 1999)
<http:www.natlaw.com/pubs/spmxbk3.htm>.
2 The National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, located in Tucson, Arizona, with the
support of the National Association of Notaries and the College of Notaries of the Federal
District of Mexico, has proposed a system of creating and recording secured interests modeled
on Article 9 of the United States Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). See The American Law
Institute, Transnational Insolvency Project, International Statement of Mexican Bankruptcy
Law, Tentative Draft (Apr. 15, 1998) [hereinafter Mexican Bankruptcy Statement], at 194.
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filling its NAFTA obligations than the effective but incomplete efforts of the Securities
Guaranty, the 1993 Foreign Investment Law, and the 1995 Amendments to that law.
This article will analyze issues arising from the Securities Guaranty from the perspec-
tive of a potential creditor, LongTerm Investments (LongTerm), a financial services com-
pany incorporated and domiciled in the state of New York, that wishes to finance securi-
ties market operations by Mexican debtors based in Mexico City. LongTerm would like to
reduce the risk of such financing by acquiring a secured interest in publicly traded securi-
ties owned by the parties it intends to finance. LongTerm is not well acquainted with the
different forms of secured financing under Mexican law, but would like to choose the
method which offers the best combination of flexibility in the range of securities which
may serve as collateral, efficacy in the sale and distribution of proceeds of the securities in
the event of default, and priority vis-A-vis other creditors in a bankruptcy situation.
LongTerm would also like to maximize the likelihood of enforcing a secured financing
arrangement by a Mexican court ruling or bankruptcy decree, as well as by a United
States court as to U.S.-based debtor assets.
LongTerm's potential use of the Securities Guaranty to obtain a secured interest in
Mexico raises issues not only under Mexican law, but also under the NAFTA and U.S.
bankruptcy law. However, discussion of these issues first requires an overview of applica-
ble secured financing mechanisms available under Mexican law.
II. Secured Interests under Mexican Law.
Secured interests in the United States and Canada are governed by U.C.C. Article 9
(Article 9) and the Canadian Personal Property Securities Acts (PPSA) respectively. Both
Article 9 and the PPSA recognize a "single, comprehensive concept of a security interest' 3
Mexico, however, lacks such a comprehensive treatment of secured interests, instead
addressing the concept in "an array of provisions" found in the General Law of Credit
Instruments and Operations (Ley General de Titulos y Operaci6nes de Crdito, hereinafter
LGTOC), the General Law of Auxiliary Credit Organizations and Activities (Ley General
de Organizaci6nes y Actividades Auxilliares de Crditos, hereinafter LGOAAC) the Law of
Credit Institutions (Ley de Instituci6nes de Crdito, hereinafter LIC), the Mexican Civil
Code (C6digo Civil para El Distrito Federal, hereinafter Civil Code) and Commercial Code
(C6digo de Comercial, hereinafter Commercial Code). 4
The Securities Guaranty, created by the 1993 amendments to the Securities Market
Law (Ley del Mercado de Valores, hereinafter LMV), is intended to offer a more workable
alternative to the regular pledge (Pledge) secured financing mechanism, which was seen
as "cumbersome and inadequate" for securities market needs. 5 The Securities Guaranty
structure requires a written agreement (Securities Guaranty Agreement) among debtor,
creditor, and intermediary. Brokerage houses or other financial institutions may act as
3 Id. at 149.
4 See Perfection of Security Interests in Instruments and Documents: A Condensed Comparison, The
National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade (visited June 30, 1999) <http://www.nat-
law.com/pubs/spmxsc 1.htm>.
5 Mexican Bankruptcy Statement, supra note 2, at 170.
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the intermediary between the debtor and creditor.6 The intermediary must maintain an
account with the Instituto para el Deposito de Valores (INDEVAL) 7, the central depository
in which physical certificates representing publicly traded securities in Mexico are kept.
Such an intermediary accepts publicly traded securities from the debtor as a guaranty and
deposits them with the ejecutor. The parties may select a brokerage firm or credit institu-
tion as ejecutor, as long as the brokerage firm or credit institution is not also acting as the
intermediary under the Securities Guaranty Agreement. 8 A copy of the Securities
Guaranty Agreement must be delivered to INDEVAL, which debits the intermediary's
account for the pledged securities and credits the securities to a separate INDEVAL
account established to hold the pledged securities.9
Upon default, the creditor notifies the ejecutor and requests the sale of the deposited
securities. The ejecutor in turn notifies in writing both INDEVAL and the debtor of the
default and impending sale. The debtor then has an opportunity to cure the default.' 0 If
the debtor is unable to cure the default, INDEVAL transfers the securities to the ejecutor's
account, who in turn sells the securities on the stock market at fair market value, the pro-
ceeds from which are used to satisfy the creditor, with any remaining proceeds going to
6 LMV article 21 states, "(t)he registration of a Company in the Intermediaries Section of the
National Registry of Securities and Intermediaries grants to such company the qualification of
an intermediary in the securities market"
7 INDEVAL is Mexico's central securities depository "for the custody, administration, clearing,
netting, settlement, and transfer of securities in the Mexican securities market' Memorandum
Examining the Need for Harmonization and Modernization of Mexico's Securities Ownership,
Transfer, and Pledging Laws, National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade 3 (1998)
(hereinafter Securities Memo].
8 LMV article 99 states, "the parties by mutual consent (may) designate an executor of the secu-
rities guaranty, appointment that could fall into a brokerage firm other than the firm carrying
out the transaction, or in a credit institution which does not form part of the same financial
group of the brokerage firm involved in the respective transaction" Under the Securities
Guaranty structure, the intermediary financial institution may accept "Mexican cetes (or other
publicly traded securities) as a guaranty and deposit them with a third party (ejecutor), another
casa de bolsa, a brokerage house, or another bank. It is essential that the depository be separate
from the same financial group in order for this new structure to work?' Secured Financing of
Personal Property in Mexico: A Panel Discussion, comments of Lic. Agustin Berdeja-Prieto, at
154, <http://natlaw.com/pubs/usmxlaw/usmjnm20.htm> [hereinafter Panel Discussion].
However, if not also acting as the creditor taking the security interest, "(a) brokerage house
may act as both the intermediary that maintains the (Securities Guaranty Agreement) account
with INDEVAL and the ejecutor" Securities Memo, supra note 7, at 23. LMV article 99 further
provides that "when the brokerage firm in question is not the creditor of the obligation guar-
anteed, it may act as executor.' Compare U.C.C. article 9-303, which permits creditor posses-
sion of collateral for perfection of a secured interest, including possession of deposited securi-
ties. See Margaret Rosso Grossman & Keith G. Meyer, Agricultural Credit Institutions,
Operations, and Guarantees in the United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 275, 302 (1998).
9 See Securities Memo, supra note 7, at 23.
10 The debtor may cure by either paying the debt or, in the case of default due to a drop in the
value of the securities, by sufficiently providing additional securities to secure the obligation.
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the debtor.I l This extrajudicial liquidation and delivery of proceeds to the creditor expe-
dites the default process as compared with the Pledge. Further, the only formality
required under the Securities Guaranty is that the written agreement be delivered to the
INDEVAL with no additional delivery or registration requirements. This freedom from
formal requirements, coupled with the extrajudicial sale and distribution mechanism, is a
more streamlined procedure than that offered by the Pledge.
III. The Pledge under Mexican Law.
Mexican law recognizes both civil and commercial pledges for the creation of secured
interests. Mexico, as a civil law system, creates a dual statutory framework for governing
commercial and civil transactions. Transactions determined to be principally civil in
nature are governed by the Civil Code, while transactions determined to be principally
commercial in nature are governed by the Commercial Code. 12 Accordingly, a Civil
Pledge in Mexico is governed by the Civil Code, while a commercial pledge (la prenda
mercantil, hereinafter Commercial Pledge) is governed by the Commercial Code, with
supplementary Civil Code coverage. 13
The Civil Code defines a Pledge, whether civil or commercial, as a "(p)roperty right
in rem over movable, alienable goods for the purpose of guarantying the performance of
an obligation and its priorities in payment."1 4 In rem rights are enforceable against both
the debtor and third parties, as distinguished from in personam rights, which are only
enforceable against the debtor. A Pledge qualifies as "commercial" if it guarantees one or
more "enumerated acts of Congress" under article 75 of the LGTOC. If the pledged goods
consist of investment securities, the Pledge is commercial as a matter of law. 15
11 See Securities Memo, supra note 7, at 23. LMV article 99 provides, "If the grantor of the guar-
anty does not exhibit or credits the payment or increases the guaranty in a sufficient amount,
as the case may be, the executor will order the sale of the securities guaranteed through a stock
exchange, at the corresponding market price, up to the amount required to cover the principal
and agreed expenses, which will be delivered to the creditor. If any balance should remain,
either in cash or in securities, it will be placed at the disposal of the guarantor."
12 Generally, Mexican civil law includes family law, property law, contract law, and the law of suc-
cession, while Mexican commercial law includes corporate law, banking law, negotiable instru-
ment law, bankruptcy, maritime, and insurance law. See David W. Banowsky, Possibilities for
Cross-BorderAsset-Backed Lending in Mexico, 1 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 20 (Autumn 1995).
13 At least two decisions by the Mexican Supreme Court have held commercial pledges to be
exclusively covered by the LGTOC, with no supplementary Civil Code coverage. However,
such decisions do not have binding jurisprudencia effect. See TODD C. NELSON, HARMONIZATION
OF THE SECURED FINANCING LAWS OF THE NAFTA PARTNERS: Focus ON MEXICO 17 (1995) (citing
Banco Comercial Mexicano, 11 Boletin de Informacion Judicial 671 (1956); Oscar Torres, 113
S.J.F. 5a. 943 (1952)).
14 John Gerber, Secured Credit Devices in Latin America: A Comparison of Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 680 (1969) (citing Civil Code article 2856).
15 See NELSON, supra note 13, at 17 (citing LGTOC article 1).
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Under the Civil Code, a Pledge is evidenced by a written pledge agreement (Pledge
Agreement) and perfected by actual delivery to the pledgee. 16 Similarly, LGTOC article 334
requires for commercial pledges delivery of the pledged goods either to the creditor or a
third party depository. 17 Constructive delivery may be obtained by use of such a third
party depository, or, in the case of the "habilitacion o avio" or "refaccionario" mechanisms,
by the pledgor retaining possession of the pledged goods. 18 However, perfection of a
secured interest using constructive delivery requires registration of the Pledge Agreement
so as to provide notice to third parties. 19 Even when the Commercial Code does not
expressly require registration, Mexican lawyers often imply a common-usage registration
from the customary understanding that, for a non-possessory pledge to be valid against
third parties, the Pledge must be registered in the Public Registry of Property and
Commerce.20 Registration can be an "expensive formality"'2 1 with duties paid to the public
registry while nonetheless remaining vulnerable to super-priority claims from unpaid
workers and tax authorities, discussed in detail in the bankruptcy section below.
In addition to the Pledge's requirements of delivery or registration for perfection of
the interest, a creditor can only initiate a sale of the pledged goods by public auction by
petitioning a court, and only after the guaranteed obligation under the Pledge Agreement
matures. Unlike the Civil Pledge, however, under the Commercial Pledge a creditor may
16 See Civil Code article 2858. However, if delivery is constructive, where the pledge res is deliv-
ered either to a third party, or actually retained by the debtor, registration is required for per-
fection of the interest. David W. Banowsky & Carlos A. Gabuardi, Secured Credit Transactions
in Mexico, 28 INT'L LAW. 263, 280 (1994) (citing Civil Code articles 2859,2860).
17 See Mexican Bankruptcy Statement, supra note 2, at 155.
18 The credito de habilitacion o avio (production credit) and credito refaccionario (installation
credit) are special mechanisms for collateralizing credits which are secured by certain materials
or equipment the continued possession of which is necessary for the debtor to operate their
business. Because of the debtor's practical need to maintain possession over such goods,
Mexican law allows for an exception to the ordinary secured financing requirement of delivery
of the pledged goods to the creditor or third party depository. See John E. Rogers & Carlos de
la Garza-Santos, General Goods: A Case Involving Security Interests in Inventory and Accounts in
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, 5 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 3 (1997). Under either of these mecha-
nisms, the pledgor is limited to specified uses of any credit arising from these mechanisms. See
Mexican Bankruptcy Statement, supra note 2, at 156.
19 Civil Code article 2859 states, "Cuando la prenda quede en poder del deudor, para que surta efec-
toscontra tercero debe inscribirse en el registro public." A pledge agreement may be registered by
recording the agreement in the Public Registry of the city where the funds are located. See
John E. Rogers, Secured Financing of Personal Property in Mexico: A Panel Discussion, 2 U.S.-
MEx. L.J. 149, 153 (1994).
20 See Wilson-Molina, supra note 1, at 11. The Commercial Code expressly permits reliance on
custom to create law. See Commercial Code arts. 2, 11, 308. Customary law may be established
by the repeated reliance of Mexican courts on a certain custom as a source of law. More gener-
ally, "it requires a consistent pattern of behavior by nation-states and a belief by those states
that such behavior is legally required." Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States
Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 53 (1995) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) cmts. b, c).
21 Thomas S. Heather & Martha Trardt Collins, Secured Financing of Machinery &. Equipment,
Including Cross-Border Leasing and Conditional Sales Contracts, 5 U.S.-MExico L.J. 23, 25
(1997).
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also petition the court before a guaranteed obligation matures if the value of the pledged
goods falls below 120 percent of the debt amount. 22 However, even under the
Commercial Pledge's broader remedy scheme, the required judicial role in the sale and
redistribution of proceeds from the pledged securities imposes significant transaction
costs upon a creditor attempting to reclaim an outstanding debt.
Notice of the creditor's request for a judge-conducted sale and redistribution of the
collateral is given to the debtor. The debtor may oppose the sale within three days if ten-
dering the amount of the indebtedness, increasing the amount and thereby the value of
the pledged goods, or making the necessary payments due on the pledged securities.23 If
the sale does occur, the collateral must be sold at market price, which for publicly traded
securities would be the price quoted on the exchange. 24 The proceeds from a sale are kept
in pledge rather than passing to the creditor directly. Therefore, under the Pledge mecha-
nism, a creditor is only secured by the substitution of one type of value for another to be
held in pledge-sale proceeds in place of the pledged good itself-rather than directly
receiving the proceeds from the judicially-administered sale.2 5
One response to the criticism that sale proceeds should pass directly to the creditor
under the Pledge is that LGTOC article 335, which provides that in rem rights of the
22 See Agusta Berdefa-Prieta, Debt Collateralization and Business Insolvency: A Review of the Mexican
Legal System, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 227 (1993) (citing LGTOC articles 340, 342).
23 See Mexican Bankruptcy Statement, supra note 2, at 158 (citing LGTOC articles 340-42), which
read as follows:
Article 340. Any creditor and the trustee may request the annulment of the agreement,
although the periods for appeal have passed, based upon the following reasons:
I. Defects in the procedures set for the notification, celebration and deliberation of
the meeting of the creditors;
II. The failure of the appearance or representation of any of the voters, whenever
their vote decides the majority in number or quantity;
III. Fraudulent information between the debtor and one or more creditors or among
the creditors, causing them to vote for the agreement;
IV. Fraudulent exaggeration of claims to achieve the majority of amount;
V. Fraudulent errors in the general balance sheet of the business of the bankrupt or
in the information of the trustee to facilitate the admission of the proposals of the
debtor.
Article 341. The opposing creditor who is trying to annul the agreement, according to
the previous article shall prove that he did not know the reasons that the latter
alleges as a basis for his opposition.
Article 342. The special recourse of nullity may only be interposed within three
months following the date of the executory sentence of approval of the agreement
and shall be substantiated in writing.
24 See NELSON, supra note 13, at 33 (citing LGTOC article 341).
25 One Commentator has described this element of the regular Pledge as "incomprehensible." See
id. (citing Doctor Joaquin Rodriguez y Rodriguez, who argued that the sale proceeds should
pass to the creditor rather than merely creating "a substitution value for a defaulted obliga-
tion." Rodriguez y Rodriguez, Joaquin. Derecho Mercantil. Decimo-octava Edicion. Editorial
Porrua, S.A., Mexico, 1985, Tomo II, p. 266).
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Pledge follow the pledged good, even if substituted for other fungible goods, 26 can be
analogized to the proceeds provisions of article 9 and the PPSA. 27 However, such a con-
struction requires understanding "fungibility" broadly enough to include merely an
equality of replacement monetary value. Moreover, given the general civil law rule that all
creditors have equal standing when attempting to satisfy claims out of a debtor's assets,
"the legislative provisions creating and defining the rights of secured creditors are strictly
construed."28 Questions of construction aside, it remains clear that under the Securities
Guaranty, the ejecutor is empowered to directly transfer the proceeds from a sale of
pledged securities to the creditor, while under the regular Pledge the precise relationship
between the creditor and proceeds from a judge-conducted sale of pledged goods is more
controversial. The transaction costs imposed by judicial control over both the sale and
redistribution of proceeds phases of the Pledge mechanism procedure significantly weak-
en the appeal of the Pledge vis-a-vis the Securities Guaranty for a potential creditor like
LongTerm.
In addition, because a pledge creates a right in rem over the pledged goods, the
pledgee's claim will follow the inventory into the hands of good-faith buyers and contin-
ue unless the secured debt is satisfied or the pledgee expressly releases his lien. Thus, ordi-
nary course buyers in Mexico, if desiring full confidence in the title being acquired, must
bear the formidable burden of determining that the item is not subject to a pledge.2 9
Article 9, in contrast, offers greater protection for ordinary course buyers, even when a
security interest is perfected and when the buyer knows of its existence.30
The Securities Guaranty's freedom from registration requirements, while lowering a
creditor's transaction costs, may raise due process concerns by creditors who lack notice
of a "secret lien" encumbering a debtor subject to the Securities Guaranty. Although
INDEVAL, as a central depository institution, must assure the confidentiality of its hold-
ings, 31 article 72 of the LMV likely provides relief from such due process concerns: any
person "giving bona fide evidence of having a legitimate interest" in information on the
holdings of a securities depository institution may obtain such information from the
institution. 32
26 Article 335 reads, "When fungible assets or instruments are given in pledge, such pledge will
survive and continue to exist even when such assets or titles are substituted by other assets or
titles of the same specie." Note that article 335 refers to specie, but not quality or quantity. See
NELSON, supra note 13, at 21.
27 SeeWilson-Molina, supra note 1, at C(3).
28 David W. Banowsky & Carlos A. Gabuardi, Secured Credit Transactions in Mexico, 28 INT'L
LAW. 263, 264 (1994) (citing John Gerber, Secured Credit Devices in Latin America: A
Comparison of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 23 U. MAMi L. REV. 680 (1969)).
29 See NELSON, supra note 13, at 29.
30 U.C.C. § 9-307(1) states, "A buyer in ordinary course of business other than a person buying
farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest
created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer
knows of its existence.' U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1998).
31 "Under article 72 of the Securities Market Law, and in the same manner as banks and broker-
age houses, central depository institutions operations are confidential and cannot be revealed
to any person other than the interested parties, except for judicial and tax authorities."
Mexican Bankruptcy Statement, supra note 2, at 175 (fn. 395).
32 LMV article 72.
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While the Pledge lacks the expedience and flexibility of an extrajudicial auction 33
and carries the uncertainty of the creditor's status vis-a-vis proceeds from a sale of
pledged goods, the regular Pledge does create a right in rem in such goods, granting the
creditor priority in a bankruptcy setting that an in personam interest created by Securities
Guaranty does not. The Securities Guaranty Agreement merely gives rise to an in person-
am interest because the creditor holds an interest in the account that contains the securi-
ties, rather than a traceable right in the underlying securities themselves. This inability to
secure an in rem interest would be further frustrated for LongTerm if the deposited secu-
rities fall under a category of publicly held securities whose ownership is limited either
partially or completely to Mexican nationals, such as cetes,34 or if the securities represent
equity interests in corporations whose ownership is limited partially or completely to
Mexican nationals by law.35 The ability of a potential creditor to evaluate the merits of
securing an interest either via the Pledge or Securities Guaranty is preserved by article 99
of the LMV, which merely creates an optional alternative to, rather than mandatory
replacement of, the Pledge. However, a third secured financing option for LongTerm
exists, the Guaranty Trust.
IV. The Guaranty Trust.
Another secured interest mechanism which allows securities to be deposited with a
third party is the guaranty trust (fideicomiso de garantia, hereinafter Guaranty Trust). The
trust agreement (fideicomiso, hereinafter Trust Agreement) is similar in structure to a
common law trust. A settlor (fideicomitente, hereinafter settlor) conveys collateral to a
trustee (fiduciario, hereinafter trustee), for the benefit of a beneficiary (fideicomisario,
hereinafter beneficiary). The Guaranty Trust transfers legal title (el Dominio) from the
settlor to the trustee.36
The Guaranty Trust offers two principle advantages. First, as under the Securities
Guaranty, an extrajudicial auction procedure may be established in the Trust Agreement.
Second, unlike the Securities Guaranty, once delivered to the trustee, the property held in
trust legally leaves the estate of the debtor to become part of the trust's estate. Therefore,
even in a bankruptcy proceeding, property held in trust, being "off the books" of the
debtor, is beyond the reach of creditors. 37 However, if the debtor remains the beneficiary
of any of, or proceeds from, the property held in trust, such property may remain subject
33 Indeed, such proceedings under the regular pledge "usually take at least a few months to con-
clude ... (and) if a debtor has the means and is so inclined ... the sale of the collateral could
easily be delayed for up to two years." See NELSON, supra note 13, at 34.
34 See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, 4A INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION
10C: "Mexico" (1990). "Cetes" are short-term, peso-denominated, government-issued debt.
Limiting foreign investor access to these securities in favor of Mexican nationals is intended to
produce a stabilizing effect within a capital market system prone to shocks of foreign capital
flight. See, e.g., Nora Lustig, Mexico in Crisis, the U.S. to the Rescue: The Financial Assistance
Packages of 1982 and 1985,2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 25 (1997).
35 These limitations, under Mexico's Foreign Investment Law, are discussed in detail below.
36 Wilson-Molina, supra note 1, at 16.
37 Mexican Bankruptcy Statement, supra note 2, at 168.
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to the bankruptcy estate. The Guaranty Trust is governed generally by the LGTOC and
the LIC, and may be created to include receivables, instruments, monies, and securities,
which are entrusted to the fiduciario, which is normally a financial institution, but may
also be an insurance company, bonding company, or brokerage house.38 Perfection of a
Trust Agreement requires the agreement to be in writing and comply with applicable laws
governing transfer of the entrusted rights and/or property.39 When the deposited goods
are securities, the Trust Agreement need not be notarized, and may simply be formed by
the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary.40 In the event of default, typically the trustee will be
authorized to collect or dispose of the assets without judicial intervention, pursuant to
the terms of the corresponding Trust Agreement. 41 However, the trustee must be express-
ly and specifically authorized to carry out the beneficiaries' instructions, or the extrajudi-
cial advantage of the Guaranty Trust structure will be lost.42
In addition, trustee fees may themselves be significant obstacles to the efficacy of the
Guaranty Trust. While banks set schedules as ceilings for trustee fees, lesser rates can be
negotiated and will vary according to the nature of the property.4 3 Trustee risk turns on
the extent to which they are obligated to participate in administration of the collateral,
and are therefore exposed to potential personal liability. Forming a technical committee
to direct trustee decisions can reduce such liability.44
For bankruptcy purposes, deposited goods are removed from the debtor's estate
under the Guaranty Trust, but not the Securities Guaranty. 45 However, while debtor
insolvency is a more important issue under the Securities Guaranty than the Guaranty
Trust, intermediary insolvency-that of the ejecutor under the Securities Guaranty and of
the trustee under the Guaranty Trust-remains important for both mechanisms.
Mexican law is unsettled as to whether an investor has a property or contractual
interest in a securities account held by an intermediary.46 U.C.C. article 8, which governs
securities holding mechanisms, confers upon the investor an interest in a pro-rata por-
tion of a pool of securities held by an intermediary with whom that investor has a direct
38 Berdeja-Prieto, supra note 8, at 237. Brokerage houses are expressly permitted to act as trustees
by LMV article 22 section IV, which provides that brokerage houses may "act as trustees in
businesses which are directly linked to their own activities."
39 LGTOC article 352.
40 Securities Memo, supra note 7, at 25.
41 Id.
42 Absent agreement on the terms of liquidation, LMV article 103 requires the trustee to follow
certain procedures, including the LGTOC article 341 requirement that the beneficiary notify
the appropriate court of debtor default, and request judicial permission to liquidate the
deposited goods. Securities Memo, supra note 7, at 25.
43 Id. at 34.
44 Id.
45 While "credits supported by a securities guaranty enjoy no special right in bankruptcy,' "in the
case of a guaranty trust settled by the debtor, the assets securing the obligation have left the
debtor's estate pre-insolvency." Mexican Bankruptcy Statement, supra note 2, at 177, 179.
46 "Language used in certain provisions of the LMV suggests that the investor holds a property
interest in securities held indirectly through an intermediary." Securities Memo, supra note 7,
at 8.
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contractual relationship. 47 Arguments that Mexican law provides for a property interest
in such deposited securities rely largely on the agency relationship created by the
Securities Guaranty arrangement. LMV article 90 provides that for "securities intermedi-
ation contracts:' pursuant to which the Securities Guaranty is created, investors grant the
brokerage firm a "general mandate" to act on their behalf. Therefore, it is argued, such a
commercial mandate creates an agency relationship that implies control and ownership
over the securities by the principal, meaning the beneficiary.48
The Guaranty Trust structure, in contrast, is not as easily ftamed as an agency rela-
tionship, given both the needs to expressly and specifically empower the trustee, as well as
the significant risk of personal liability faced by trustees. Commercial Code article 285
provides, "If an agent contracts expressly in the name of the principal, he shall not incur
personal liability and his rights and obligations shall be those under a common mercan-
tile agency pursuant to the provisions of the civil law." However, one of the most signifi-
cant drawbacks to the Guaranty Trust structure is the risk of trustee unwillingness to exe-
cute a Trust Agreement for fear of such action resulting in personal liability as a violation
of the debtor's due process rights. 49 Further, the LMV limitations placed on intermediary
control over deposited securities, 50 which also serve to strengthen the argument for a
creditor's property interest in deposited securities under Mexican law, are more applicable
to the Securities Guaranty structure, which exclusively concerns securities, than the
Guaranty Trust structure, which includes all classes of goods and rights, excepting strictly
personal rights.5' Therefore, while the Guaranty Trust may provide for better protection
against debtor insolvency, the Securities Guaranty, which provides better support for
claiming a creditor's property interest in securities held by an intermediary, may provide
for better protection against intermediary insolvency as well as stronger support generally
for any claim to securities held by a third party depository.
However, strong arguments also exist for the Securities Guaranty merely giving rise
to a contractual claim against the intermediary. Specifically, the fungibility of securities
held by intermediaries is in tension with the civil law emphasis on the ability to identify
and trace any goods over which one may have a property interest.52 However, LMV arti-
cle 68, which requires intermediaries to maintain a separate INDEVAL account for their
customers' securities, may be seen as characterizing a particular account of securities
more concretely than as a mere fungible portion of a larger genus. 53
The need to create arguments in favor of a creditor's property right in collateral
deposited with third parties under Mexican law illustrates the importance of title for
strengthening the position of secured creditors in civil law systems. Article 9 has rendered
title irrelevant for determining the existence of a security interest and the rights of the
parties to the secured transaction. 54 Mexico's continuing emphasis on title and in rem
47 Securities Memo, supra note 7, at 7.
48 Id. at 8.
49 Heather & Collins, supra note 21, at 23.
50 See, e.g., LMV articles 78 and 95, and Securities Memo, supra note 7, at 8.
51 LGTOC article 351.
52 Securities Memo, supra note 7, at 9.
53 Id.
54 SeeU.C.C. § 9-202.
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interests when analyzing secured transactions may undermine the ability of a mechanism
like the Securities Guaranty to bring Mexican secured financing law more into line with
its NAFTA partners. However, just as appeal to custom and usage has given rise to the
"common usage registration" of commercial pledges, 55 perhaps such practical concerns
can also create an implied property interest for the creditor under the Securities
Guaranty. Appeal to custom and usage in creating law is expressly permitted by the
Commercial Code.56 While such a development may be an important step in separating
title from secured interest analysis under Mexican law,57 the use of custom to create legal-
ly binding registration requirements is unprecedented, challenging any attempt to simi-
larly imply a legally binding property interest from the Securities Guaranty.
Moreover, implying a possessory interest from the Securities Guaranty may bring Mexican
secured financing law closer to its historical basis in the Roman Law pignus, which represented
a secured transaction in which possession of a movable good was transferred from debtor to
creditor.58 While the Roman pignus did require ownership for in rem actions, such lack of own-
ership did not prevent the creditor from qualifying for a possessory interdict. 59
These issues of reform aside, LongTerm should consider whether the value of secur-
ing a possessory interest by way of the Pledge outweighs the flexibility and efficiency
advantages of the Securities Guaranty and Guaranty Trust. If opting for flexibility and
efficiency, LongTerm should then weigh the relative merits and risks of the Securities
Guaranty and Guaranty Trust as to exposure to debtor and/or intermediary default, risk
of personal liability, strength of claim to deposited collateral, and the cost of formalities
for creating and perfecting the secured interests. However, such analysis requires discus-
sion of Mexico's continued adherence to an in rem/in personam distinction within
secured financing and the consequences of this distinction for bankruptcy.
V. Mexico's Roman Law Heritage: Title Requirements for
In Rem Interests.
Mexico, unlike the United States and Canada, is a civil law system, which reflects
traces of its Roman Law heritage. The enduring requirement, under the Civil Pledge, of
actual delivery of secured goods to the creditor reflects the delivery requirement of the
ancient Roman pledge. 60 Of the NAFTA countries, only Mexico distinguishes in rem from
in personam interests when analyzing secured interests, and thereby limits the scope with-
in which a secured creditor may enforce their interest.
55 See discussion of common usage registration, supra.
56 Commercial Code articles 2, 11, 308.
57 Certainty in the law of secured transactions requires that the different secured transactions be
reduced to one right. This right cannot be based upon a claim of ownership or of title.
Instead, it should be based upon a claim to the possession of the collateral. What borrowers
grant to lenders in a secured transaction is not an absolute and exclusive right of ownership,
but a relative right to obtain possession.
NELSON, supra note 13, at 119.
58 Alejandro M. Garro, Security Interests in Personal Property in Latin America: A Comparison with
Article 9 and a Model for Reform, 9 Hous. J. INT'L L. 157, 163 (1987).
59 Id. at 165.
60 Wilson-Molina, supra note 1, at section V(A).
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In rem rights refer to rights in things, which the ancient Romans applied to "objects
that are counted, weighed, or measured."61 Under Mexican law, rights in rem are "specifi-
cally set forth in the law" (such as ownership and usufruct), while in personam rights may
include both rights expressly set forth and rights that "arise in non-specific or atypical
ways" (such as rights arising out of contracts or torts).62 The Mexican system maintains
the Roman distinction between concrete and less clearly defined interests. This distinc-
tion sharply contrasts with the U.C.C. and PPSA regimes:
For security purposes, title to personalty is immaterial in the United States
and Canada. U.S. and Canadian lenders may retain neither title nor a rever-
sionary claim to title in order to secure payment, as do conditional sellers in
Mexico. If they attempted to do so, the courts would simply re-characterize
their 'title' as a security interest subject to Article 9 or the PPSA. As a result,
arguments based on the location of title are irrelevant in the United States
and Canada.63
Therefore, while all three systems characterize in rem interests as enforceable against
both the debtor and third parties, and in personam interests as only enforceable against
debtors, under Article 9 and the PPSA, secured interests are by definition in rem,64 while
Mexican law looks more to title than secured interests for determining in rem interests.
One consequence of this emphasis on ownership is the potentially burdensome regis-
tration requirements under the commercial pledge. The requirement that registries pro-
vide historical information concerning the chain of title to the pledged goods, where
goods such as securities are of a "changing, ephemeral or untraceable" nature, renders the
registry in a securities context nearly unworkable. 65
Another consequence of the in rem/in personam distinction is that in Mexico, the
majority of categories of secured interests merely create in personam rights. 66 From this,
creditors looking to limit exposure to risk by use of secured financing may nonetheless
face significant risk in the form of a lack of priority in bankruptcy. While the pledge
mechanisms, including the avio and refaccionario credits, give rise to in rem interests
upon perfection in the form of registration, no such publicity, and therefore no in rem
interest, is available to a creditor under the Securities Guaranty.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 47.
64 Secured interests under U.S. law are defined as creating "an express interest in property; name-
ly, the right to repossess an asset of the debtor in default and the right to take the asset ahead of
other persons with claims against the debtor in question:' Wilson-Molina, supra note 1, (citing
RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 42 (5th ed. 1993)).
65 NELSON, supra note 13, at 8.
66 The Mexican Bankruptcy Statement enumerates eight categories of secured interests under
Mexican law, only three of which create in rem rights. The mortgage, pledge (which includes
the avio and refaccionario credits), and pledge bonds create rights in rem, while the aval, bond,
letter of credit, guaranty trust, and securities guaranty create rights in personam. Mexican
Bankruptcy Statement, supra note 2, at 148.
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VI. Bankruptcy Consequences of the In Rem/In Personam Distinction.
"The risk of debtor insolvency is a major (perhaps the major) determinant of
whether a credit transaction will be seen as profitable for the creditor."67 Under the
Mexican Bankruptcy Law (Ley de Quiebras y Suspension de Pagos, hereinafter LQSP),
creditors of the bankrupt are prioritized by placement in one of six categories, each cate-
gory receiving its full share before the next group enters the distribution: (i) Singularly
privileged creditors (which includes bankruptcy estate administration costs and labor
claims for accrued wages and severance pay); (ii) Mortgage and Pledge creditors; (iii) The
Federal Treasury for unpaid federal taxes; (iv) Creditors with special privilege (which
includes commission agents, merchandise vendors, and carriers); (v) Generally unsecured
commercial creditors; (vi) Generally unsecured civil creditors.68
Although Pledge creditors are given relatively high priority under the LQSP scheme,
unpaid wages and severance pay may exhaust a significant portion of the pledgee's collat-
eral. 69 Securities Guaranty creditors, lacking an in rem interest in the collateral, would fall
under category (v), "generally unsecured commercial creditors" since, as noted above, use
of securities as collateral is commercial as a matter of law. Therefore, were LongTerm to
opt for the Securities Guaranty, they would only have preference over "generally unse-
cured civil creditors." LongTerm's desire to lower its credit risk appears difficult to achieve
in a bankruptcy setting: administration costs of the bankruptcy estate and labor claims
("singularly privileged creditors"), mortgage and pledge creditors, unpaid taxes, and com-
mission agents and merchandise vendors would all have preference over LongTerm, 70 and
would indeed need to satisfy their claims entirely from the bankruptcy estate before
LongTerm could even begin to share pro rata in the distribution among other creditors in
its category.7 1
However, in exchange for this relatively high exposure to debtor default, LongTerm
would likely have a stronger possessory claim to the deposited securities, 72 and likely, less
exposure to liability arising from due process claims, given that the extrajudicial Securities
Guaranty procedure is expressly laid out in LMV article 99, while the Guaranty Trust main-
tains a judicially-administered default procedure absent party consent to the contrary.73
Moreover, a bankruptcy judge may choose not to recognize a Guaranty Trust Agreement if
formed during a "suspicious period" prior to the debtor declaration of bankruptcy, and
order that the deposited collateral not be separated from the bankruptcy estate.7 4
67 Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next Frontier, 33 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 173,174 (1998).
68 LQSP articles 262-65. Discussed in Charles A. Beckham, Jr. & Roberto Fernandez, Cross-Border
Insolvency: The Bridge You Never Want to Cross, 4 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 50, 60 (Winter
1998).
69 NELSON, supra note 13, at 35.
70 Beckham & Fernandez, supra note 68, at 50.
71 Banowsky & Gabuardi, supra note 16, at 284.
72 See arguments for possessory interests arising from the Securities Guaranty above.
73 See LMV art. 103, referring to procedures in LGTOC art. 341.
74 Under Mexican bankruptcy law, the court may determine at what time the company became
insolvent. Any transactions occurring, or security interests created, during this so-called "sus-
picious period" will not be recognized. Heather & Collins, supra note 21, at 30.
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Mexico's focus on title for in rem interests also has potential consequences under
NAFTA. Any ownership limitations placed on foreign actors operating within the NAFTA
affects the secured interests of those actors. Therefore, the issue of priority in bankruptcy
for LongTerm gives rise to the larger issue of Mexico's obligation to afford foreign finan-
cial institutions "national treatment" under article 14 of the NAFTA.
VII. NAFTA Article 14: Non-Preferential Treatment of Financial Institutions.
Chapter 14 of the NAFTA governs the treatment each NAFTA government must pro-
vide financial institutions within its territory that are owned or seek to be owned by
investors in other NAFTA countries, as well as investors in other NAFTA countries pro-
viding cross-border financial services between NAFTA countries. Under article 1405, each
country must provide financial services firms from other NAFTA countries, treatment
that is "no less favorable" than the treatment it provides domestic firms in like circum-
stances. This "national treatment" requirement can be met by providing equally competi-
tive opportunities to domestic and foreign-owned firms. 75 Mexico took a major step
towards compliance with article 1405 with passage of the Foreign Investment Law in
1993, which liberalized restrictions on the participation of foreign financial groups within
the Mexican economy.76 Under the new law, with the exception of certain restricted sec-
tors, foreigners may own without restriction the equity of a Mexican corporation. 77
Therefore, the applicable NAFTA inquiry for LongTerm may focus on whether, in light of
the 1993 Foreign Investment Law (FIL) and subsequent 1995 Amendments to Mexican
banking law (1995 Amendments), the treatment of LongTerm under Mexican law is "no
less favorable" than the treatment such law affords to Mexican financial institutions. Such
an inquiry requires analysis of the protections available to LongTerm, vis-A-vis Mexican
creditors, under the Securities Guaranty specifically and Mexican secured financing
mechanisms generally.
While the LQSP regime, discussed above, may not establish optimal incentives for for-
eign investment in Mexico, it does not directly implicate NAFTA article 1405 unless Mexican
financial institutions would be treated more favorably than LongTerm under Mexican law. A
Mexican financial institution making use of the Securities Guaranty would also receive a
mere in personam interest in the secured assets, and would therefore also be placed into the
"generally unsecured commercial creditor" category under the LQSP.
However, if the secured assets were of a category that only Mexican nationals may own,
then, by definition, a foreign investor could not have tide to, and thus could not obtain an
in rem interest in, such assets. This has important consequences for the regular Pledge.
Under this mechanism, categories of publicly traded securities whose ownership is limited
to Mexican nationals constitute categories of assets over which Mexican nationals, but not
foreigners, may obtain a secured interest which will be given preference under the LQSP
Therefore, any limits on foreign ownership under the FIL, for purposes of NAFTA article
1405, speak to the Pledge in terms of preferential treatment for Mexican financial institu-
75 NAFTA Chapter 14 Summary, available in Westlaw NAFTA database.
76 Seeid. at 141.
77 See Humberto Gayou & Robert G. Gilbert, Legal Building Blocks for Structuring Sales in the
Mexican Market, 25 ST. MARY'S L. J. 1115, 1125 (1994).
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tions. However, the denial of in rem interests on account of ownership limitations do not
implicate the Securities Guaranty or Guaranty Trust mechanisms, since their very structures
do not confer title upon the secured creditor, regardless of nationality.
Nonetheless, such limitations may impact LongTerm's ability to expand the scope of
its financial services in Mexico. For example, if LongTerm wanted to expand beyond its
creditor role within the Securities Guaranty structure, and take on the role in certain
transactions of a third party brokerage house trustee, the ownership limitations placed on
brokerage houses, and on certain categories of publicly traded securities, would impede
LongTerm's expansion vis-A-vis unrestricted Mexican brokerage houses. Even after the
liberalizing 1995 Amendments, the limitations placed on LongTerm remain significant.
In addition, the options presented to LongTerm for obtaining a secured investment
in Mexico, if significantly less attractive than those offered by Article 9 or the PPSA, may
undermine the stability of the NAFTA economy, given the aggregate effects of potential
investors like LongTerm. "The need (for security mechanisms on personal property in
Mexico) is especially important since under the NAFTA, Mexican manufacturers, whole-
salers, and retailers are now competing with U.S. and Canadian firms, which do avail
themselves of the asset maneuverability and cheaper credit that Article 9 of the U.C.C.
and the Canadian Personal Property Security Act provide."78 Under Article 9, a secured
loan creates an express interest in property, with a right to repossess an asset of the debtor
in default, including a priority right to such an asset vis-A-vis other creditors. 79 Moreover,
a creditor may resort to extrajudicial, self-help means in the repossession of such an asset,
which is forbidden by the Mexican constitution.80 Therefore, the enduring role of title in
Mexican secured financing law, with its consequences in bankruptcy as discussed above,
arguably challenges the stability of the NAFTA regime when potential investors like
LongTerm-whether American, Mexican, or Canadian-repeatedly opt out of the
Mexican market, and thereby fail to provide more affordable credit for the developing
Mexican economy.
Article 6 of the FIL limits ownership of corporations exclusively to Mexican nationals
for certain limited industries.8 1 Article 7 places softer limits on foreign ownership, but
over a much wider range of industries.8 2 Most relevant for LongTerm, foreign ownership
may not exceed thirty percent for financial group holding companies, commercial bank-
ing credit institutions, securities brokerage firms, and securities market specialists.
Therefore, secured in rem interests in securities of companies operating in any of the
industries enumerated in articles 6 and 7 of the FIL may be available to Mexican financial
institutions yet unavailable, or available only in part, to LongTerm. Moreover, if
LongTerm were considering participation in Securities Guaranty arrangements from the
intermediary brokerage firm side, its ownership of such an operation would be limited to
thirty percent, while Mexican firms could run such enterprises outright. LongTerm's
78 Wilson-Molina, supra note 1, at 24.
79 See id. at 2, citing to U.C.C. §§ 9-102, 9-501, 9-507 (1977).
80 U.C.C. 9-503; La Constituci6n Politica de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos art. 16.
81 These industries include national service transportation, petroleum, broadcasting, credit
unions, development banking institutions, and professional services "expressly set forth in the
applicable legal provisions." FIL art. 6 §§ I-VI.
82 Id.
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interest in including such brokerage activities within its financial services offerings may
fall under NAFTA article 1403, which requires that financial institutions not only be able
to establish operations in other NAFTA countries, but to expand such operations within
that territory.83 However, the "expansion" of such operations may be narrowly construed
to mean providing the identical financial services throughout a wider physical range of a
given territory, rather than expanding on the range of financial services provided in a
given territory. However, NAFTA provides much broader possibilities of expansion for
foreign companies operating in other NAFTA countries. 84
Although foreign investors are broadly empowered to expand operations in other
NAFTA countries, the FIL limitations on foreign ownership may fall under NAFTA's
"prudential carve-out" provision, article 1410. This provision permits NAFTA countries
to limit such ownership "for 'prudential' reasons or in pursuit of monetary and related
credit policies or exchange rate policies" 85 However, if LongTerm concluded that the lim-
itations on ownership under articles 6 and 7 of the FIL resulted in favorable treatment for
Mexican financial services institutions under NAFTA article 1405, LongTerm may be able
to initiate a dispute settlement proceeding against the Mexican government. Such a pro-
ceeding may be brought under articles 1116 and 1117 if the claim involved one of the
selected provisions of the Investment Chapter, which create an exception to the general
NAFTA rule that only NAFTA countries may initiate or participate in dispute settlement
proceedings. 86
While the 1993 FIL represented an advance in Mexico's posture toward foreign
investment, the 1995 Amendments were passed "to permit and encourage increased for-
eign investment in Mexican banks."87 Among many changes, the 1995 Amendments
raised the limit on foreign minority investment ownership in Mexican financial institu-
tions from thirty percent to forty-nine percent. While the 1995 Amendments did not
increase the five percent limit on individual ownership existing under the previous law,
they did increase to twenty percent (from ten percent) the individual ownership limit
obtainable with regulator approval.88 Further, the 1995 Amendments, by allowing foreign
investors access to a wider range of classes of stock, have made it possible for foreign
investors "to obtain some degree of control over a Mexican bank"' 89
83 See Kenneth L. Bachman et al., Financial Services Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement: An Overview, 28 INT'L LAW. 291,295 (1994).
84 For example, foreign investors may not only establish subsidiaries in Mexico, but also group
holding companies, which may then establish or acquire "other Mexican companies engaged in
providing financial services ... (and thereby) expand its business to provide any financial ser-
vice that a domestic Mexican investor could provide under Mexican law." Christopher R.
Rowley, Searching for Stability: Mexico's 1995 Banking System Reforms, 4 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv.
AM. 30,34 (Summer 1998) (citing NAFTA annex VII(C)(5)).
85 Bachman, supra note 83, at 301.
86 See id. at 304.
87 Rowley, supra note 84, at 39.
88 See id. at 41.
89 Id. Foreign investors could conceivably gain such control by having "institutional investors"
acquire a significant amount of Mexican-owned Class A majority shares, supplemented by
individual foreign investors (each holding less than five percent ownership, or less than twenty
percent with regulator approval), owning forty-nine percent of Class B shares.
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Thus, the 1995 Amendments strengthen Mexico's defense to any potential LongTerm
claim under NAFTA articles 1116 and 1117 for violation of the national treatment princi-
ple guaranteed by article 1405. However, significant limitations remain, which continue
to limit LongTerm's ability to gain in rem interests in secured assets if opting for a regular
pledge structure of financing, or LongTerm's ability to expand operations into third party
brokerage services under the Securities Guaranty. While the FIL and 1995 Amendments
may have brought Mexico closer to fulfilling its NAFTA obligations, the path to affordable
credit for Mexico may be less by national treatment and more by distancing title from the
analysis of possessory interests arising from secured financing mechanisms.
VIII. Enforcement of a Mexican Bankruptcy Decision in a U.S. Court.
Another factor in LongTerm's decision among secured financing mechanisms is the
likelihood of enforcing a Mexican bankruptcy decision in a United States court. Section
304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code enhances a foreign bankruptcy trustee's ability to suc-
ceed in a cross-border insolvency proceeding.90 Prior to section 304, U.S. courts required
that the proceeding comply with the common law doctrine of comity to be enforceable in
a U.S. court.9 1 Section 304 alters this scheme by reducing comity to merely one factor
among six for judicial consideration when deciding a question of enforcing a foreign
bankruptcy judgment, which is to be guided by the best assurance of "an economical and
expeditious administration of (foreign) estate. '9 2
90 See Helmut Gerlach, Bankruptcy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and Section 304 of
the Unites States Bankruptcy Code, Proceedings Ancillary to Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings, 22
MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 81, 106 (1998).
91 In the international bankruptcy context, comity is an attempt to reconcile the choice of law con-
cepts of universality, territoriality, and reciprocity. Universality prefers one main bankruptcy
proceeding, presumably in the country of the debtors' domicile or principle place of business,
which addresses all of the debtor's property, regardless of location, to be distributed to all credi-
tors. The territoriality approach prefers a bankruptcy proceeding to address only property that is
located within the country's jurisdiction, and to distribute such property only to creditors
appearing before a court and asserting a claim. See id. Reciprocity "exists when two countries
mutually recognize (or refuse to recognize) each other's laws.' Comity, in its broad appeal to
international duty, convenience, and the rights of a country's own citizens, gave rise to a widely
discretionary doctrine that tended to both create a nationalistic bias in favor of U.S. creditors and
discourage foreign representatives from seeking relief in U.S. courts. See Eric W. Lam, Bankruptcy
Code Section 304(B)(3): "Other Appropriate Relief"for Multinational Bankruptcy, 16 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 479,483 (1990).
92 Section 304 provides:
Cases ancillary to foreign proceedings
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court
of a petition under this section by a foreign representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party in interest does not
timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may-
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of-
(A) any action against-
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such foreign
proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
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Section 304 has been interpreted both as a move away from territoriality toward uni-
versality, and as a compromise between the two. 93 The discretionary nature of section 304
has given rise to a wide range of application, as illustrated by the contrasting approaches
taken in In re Culmer94 and In re Toga Manufacturing Limited.95
Toga featured a U.S. creditor who had obtained a valid judgment against a Canadian
company and lawfully collected certain debts owed to that company. Six months later, the
company became a debtor in Canadian insolvency proceedings and the Canadian trustee
brought an action under section 304 seeking turnover of the collected funds that had
been paid into Michigan state court. The U.S. court determined that the creditor would
be considered a general unsecured creditor in the foreign proceeding, but a secured credi-
tor with respect to the collected funds under U.S. bankruptcy law. The court concluded
that the "substantially unequal treatment" that the creditor would face warranted a denial
of the request for turnover.96 While the Toga precedent is potentially reassuring for
LongTerm should any Mexican bankruptcy trustee attempt to block a distribution of
funds to LongTerm by a U.S. court, it has been described as an "emasculation" of section
304,97 in contrast with the more deferential standard of Culmer which, unlike Toga, has
been described as a "model application" of section 304.98
In Culmer, rather than inquiring whether a Bahamian liquidation would impose
"substantially unequal treatment" upon the creditors of a Bahamian corporation, the
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect to such
property, or any act or the commencement or continuation of any judicial
proceeding to create or enforce a lien against the property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such proper-
ty, to such foreign representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall
be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of such
estate, consistent with-
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience
in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order
prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the
individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.
93 Compare Lam (arguing § 304 as a compromise between universality and territoriality) with
Gerlach (arguing § 304 as a step toward universality).
94 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
95 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
96 Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, Claims and Priorities in Ancillary Proceedings
under Section 304, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 477, 487 (1991) (citing Gallagher & Hartje, The
Effectiveness of Section 304 in Achieving Efficient and Economic Equity in Transnational
Insolvency, 1983 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 1, 21 (1983)).
97 Id. at 489.
98 Id. at 491 (citing R. GITLIN & R. MEARS, 2 INTERNATIONAL LOAN WORKOUTS AND BANKRUPTCIES 94
(1989).
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court considered whether there was anything "inherently vicious, wicked, immoral or
shocking to the prevailing American moral sense in the Bahamian laws."99 Such a lax
standard may not even have been necessary for a U.S. court to recognize the Bahamian
proceeding under section 304, because the Culmer court noted the "substantial similarity"
between American and Bahamian bankruptcy law.100 Culmer and Toga respectively illus-
trate the potential for section 304 application to serve either universalist or protectionist
ends. The two cases also illustrate two extremes, which set off an emerging, moderate
consensus under section 304: "The majority of recent cases applying section 304 ... rec-
ognize foreign insolvency proceedings as long as such proceedings comport with the
notions of fairness and due process"101
Given the uncertainty of section 304 application, LongTerm may be well-advised to
place more importance on the more determinable prospects of securing a property inter-
est in Mexican-based collateral and obtaining an expedient, extrajudicial sale and distrib-
ution of such a secured interest, rather than the less determinable prospects of further
reducing credit risk by securing U.S.-based assets in an ancillary bankruptcy proceeding
in a U.S. court. Nevertheless, use of the Pledge, Guaranty Trust, and Securities Guaranty
may receive materially different treatment under section 304 as applied by a U.S. court,
whether that court applies the Toga, Culmer, or due process standard.
While the procedural burdens associated with the Pledge may raise questions under
section 304(c)(2), which seeks to protect U.S. creditors from prejudicial or inconvenient
proceedings, it is precisely those procedural burdens which ease the due process concerns
more associated with the extrajudicially administered Securities Guaranty and Guaranty
Trust. Such due process concerns in turn implicate section 304(c)(1), which seeks the
"just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in" the foreign estate.
Therefore, while use of the Pledge may strengthen LongTerm's position by claiming
inconvenient foreign procedure under section 304(c)(2), use of the Securities Guaranty
or Guaranty Trust may cut against LongTerm by possibly raising due process concerns
under section 304(c)(1).
However, given that article 9-502(1) affords a broad, extrajudicial self-help remedy
for creditors to gain possession of secured collateral, the due process concerns raised by
the Securities Guaranty and Guaranty Trust appear to be less, rather than more, threaten-
ing than those facing debtors under U.S. law. In light of article 9-502(1), a U.S. court may
indeed be inclined to weigh creditor inconvenience more heavily than debtor due process,
and thereby negate any potential advantage of the pledge over the Securities Guaranty or
Guaranty Trust were LongTerm to seek enforcement of a Mexican bankruptcy proceeding
in a U.S. court.
Were LongTerm to choose between the Securities Guaranty and Guaranty Trust,
enforceability abroad may be of limited concern for different reasons. First, under the
Guaranty Trust, as discussed above, debtor bankruptcy is of limited concern for
LongTerm, only arising if the debtor retained a reversionary interest in the entrusted
99 Id. at 492 (citing In re Culmer, supra note 94, at 631).
100 In re Culmer. The court notes that the Bahamian law, like U.S. law, "provides a comprehensive
procedure for the orderly and equitable distribution of [the bankrupt's] assets among all of its
creditors" Id.
101 Beckham & Fernandez, supra note 68, at 70.
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property under the Trust Agreement, or if such Trust Agreement were completed during a
"suspicious period" prior to the debtor bankruptcy. U.C.C. article 8-503 is significantly
different from the Guaranty Trust mechanism, providing that securities held by an inter-
mediary for entitlement holders are neither the intermediary's property nor are they sub-
ject to the claims of the intermediary's general creditors. 102 As with the Pledge, the more
favorable creditor terms under article 8 as compared with the Guaranty Trust may pro-
vide LongTerm with some assurance of enforceability in a U.S. court. However, as dis-
cussed above, the need to create the trustee's extrajudicial functions exclusively via con-
tract, without statutory support as provided by LMV article 99 for the Securities
Guaranty, results in greater due process concerns for the Guaranty Trust than the
Securities Guaranty. Nonetheless, article 9-502(1) appears to undermine any potential
debtor due process argument to be brought by a Mexican bankruptcy trustee under sec-
tion 304.
For the Securities Guaranty under section 304, a U.S. court is likely to not protect
LongTerm's interests to the same extent as if enforcing the inconvenient pledge, but nei-
ther is a U.S. court likely to scrutinize the due process implications of the Securities
Guaranty to the extent of the Guaranty Trust. Therefore, use of the Securities Guaranty
does not appear to significantly help or hurt LongTerm's ability to enforce a bankruptcy
judgment in a U.S. court vis-A-vis the Pledge and Guaranty Trust. However, the well-
defined structure of the Securities Guaranty under LMV article 99, which helps to reduce
due process concerns, also greatly reduces the availability of debtor U.S.-based property
that may be attached by LongTerm. That is, only a broad reading of "fungibility" would
permit a creditor to attach U.S.-based assets pursuant to a debt created by the tightly
defined collateral and depository requirements of the Securities Guaranty. Therefore, if
LongTerm wants U.S.-based assets to play a significant role in their risk reduction
scheme, it may be worth absorbing some section 304 risk in the form of greater due
process concerns in exchange for more legitimate access (via careful tailoring of a
Guaranty Trust Agreement) to U.S.-based debtor assets. However, LongTerm may be even
better advised to focus more on the probability of recovering Mexican-based assets via
the Securities Guaranty, rather than spreading a Trust Agreement so thin as to provide
significant U.S.-based coverage, risking the initial enforceability of such an agreement at
the primary bankruptcy proceeding in Mexico.
An important question that 1980s cases like Culmer and Toga do not address is the
potential impact that NAFTA obligations may have on a section 304 analysis. Given the
interdependence of bankruptcy policy and creditor risk, and therefore the effects of bank-
ruptcy policy on the price of credit, U.S. courts may consider placing greater scrutiny on
the bankruptcy schemes of fellow NAFTA countries, which appear to be significantly
opposed to the U.S. bankruptcy scheme and U.S. policy as fostering affordable credit.
NAFTA's "national treatment" standard, as well as the need for relatively competitive
secured financing offerings among the NAFTA members, could thus be monitored in part
via section 304. However, such monitoring would actually drive a court toward the more
protectionist Toga standard and away from the heralded universality of Culmer.
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Therefore, U.S. courts should consider whether sacrificing some universality under sec-
tion 304 is worth the benefit of an additional method for policing NAFTA obligations
among member countries.
IX. Conclusion.
NAFTA and section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act represent harmonizing forces
operating within legal systems that retain certain fundamentally different understandings
of ownership and the relationship between creditors, debtors, and third parties.
Pragmatic attempts to dose some of these gaps, as illustrated by the Securities Guaranty,
while creating new opportunities for investment, carry far greater promise if introduced
in tandem with more fundamental changes to the law governing security interests in per-
sonal property.
Mexico currently has an opportunity to create, by way of both statutory support and
customary use, a property interest arising from the otherwise in personam mechanism of
the Securities Guaranty, which could serve as an important step in the NAFTA-driven
need for Mexico to distance its secured financing law from traditional in rem/in personam
distinctions. Softening the link between title and property interests within secured financ-
ing law may also lead to beneficial changes in Mexican bankruptcy law. Those changes are
likely to affect the price of credit as much as the laws regulating secured financing.
